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Case Comments

R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali:
Elements and Implications of the
Supreme Court’s New Rigorous
Approach to Construction of
Statutory Purpose
Marcus Moore*

I. INTRODUCTION
1. Markhali and Construction of Statutory Purpose
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. SafarzadehMarkhali,1 might be assumed to be primarily of interest to criminal
lawyers. However, the case’s greatest legal significance may lie in
an altogether different and more technical realm of law: Statutory
Interpretation. Specifically, Markhali decisively endorses a new rigorous
approach to the matter of construing a legislative purpose. Previously,
while the interpretation of legislation itself has been done employing
rigorous general approaches based on long-established and progressively
refined principles, construction of legislative objectives was typically done
employing ad hoc approaches whose most common feature was the
summary nature of the analysis. Markhali’s new framework recognizes
this, and by contrast, may be characterized as a new “Rigorous Approach”
to purpose construction that is distinct from prior approaches in at least
*
Marcus Moore, A.B. (Harvard), Hon. LL.B. & B.C.L. (McGill), D.Phil. in progress
(Oxford) is a Clarendon Scholar at the University of Oxford. His research is supported by the Ruth
Adler Fund and by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
1
[2016] S.C.J. No. 14, 2016 SCC 14 (S.C.C.), affg [2014] O.J. No. 4194 (Ont. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Markhali”].
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four ways: (1) it expressly acknowledges how critical construction of the
statutory purpose is to the outcome of many claims; (2) it is self-conscious
of the potential for a less-than-rigorous approach to be self-defeating,
given that the reason for construing the legislative object is often for subtle
comparisons with the legislative means, effects, etc.; (3) it sets out
overarching parameters that help clarify what kind of “purpose” it is the
goal of the construction exercise to determine; and (4) it delineates the
relevant indicia, and prescribes an analytical procedure to scrutinize them,
in construing the purpose. The result is an approach that is rigorous in that
it is clear, systematic, capable of consistent application, and solicitous of
in-depth adversarial argumentation and judicial justification. The advent of
this new Rigorous Approach may have a significant and salutary impact on
the adjudication of cases where the statutory purpose is a key issue.
Notable examples surveyed here include the prominent Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms2 doctrines of overbreadth, discrimination, and
proportionality. Markhali’s rigorous approach may be expected to structure
the determination of legislative purpose, discipline argument and analysis
concerning the purpose, and render the adjudication of claims which rely
importantly on statutory objectives more transparent and predictable, thus
strengthening the rule of law, and sheltering courts from unwelcome
accusations of illegitimate policy-making.3
2. Structure of this Chapter
The discussion which follows proceeds in three parts. Part II outlines
the Rigorous Approach to construction of statutory purpose which
emerges from Markhali, and contrasts this with the Summary Approach
to purpose construction typical of older cases. Part III assesses the impact
of this development on future Charter jurisprudence, surveying several
significant implications it may have in and around the adjudication of
such claims. Part IV highlights a few key questions raised by the
inauguration of the new Rigorous Approach, which remain to be worked
out in subsequent case law. A short conclusion winds up the article’s
discussion of these themes.
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
3
As the Court said it would (R. v. Moriarity, [2015] S.C.J. No. 55, 2015 SCC 55, [2015]
3 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Moriarity”]), I will use the words “purpose”, “objective”, and
“object” interchangeably in this chapter. Likewise, no difference in meaning is intended by the
variation between “statutory” and “legislative”.
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II. THE NEW RIGOROUS APPROACH TO
PURPOSE CONSTRUCTION
1. The Rigorous Approach
(a) Development
The Rigorous Approach to construction of statutory purpose stems
from the Supreme Court of Canada case, R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, a
judgment of the full bench, under the pen of the Chief Justice. Seeds of
the approach are present in two preceding unanimous judgments
released around the time Markhali was heard in November 2015 (held
concurrently under reserve until then): R. v. Moriarity4 (heard May 12,
2015) and R. v. Appulonappa5 (heard February 17, 2015). Moriarity can
be seen to ponder the theoretical rationales for a self-conscious approach
to purpose construction, point out potential pitfalls of trying to skip over
this, and delineate overarching parameters for the type of purpose the
construction aims to identify. Appulonappa, meanwhile, preoccupies
itself with mechanics of the construction, including the factors to be
considered and the manner in which to analyze them, illustrating this
in-depth Markhali, in which these various elements are confirmed,
combined, endorsed, and extended presents the Charter case law with a
new, complete, and authoritative approach to construction of the
legislative objective. As will be detailed, this approach is characterized
by its rigour, in comparison to more summary approaches often used in
older cases.
(b) Raison D’être
The emergence of the new Rigorous Approach must be seen as
reflecting a recognition of how pivotal a role is played in many cases by a
court’s assertion of the statutory purpose. Markhali proclaims it as being
“critically important” to correctly identify a law’s purpose.6 Similar
sentiments are elaborated in Moriarity, which discusses a need to be
“cautious”, to anchor the articulated purpose in the proper sources, and to
4

Id.
[2015] S.C.J. No. 59, 2015 SCC 59, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 754 (S.C.C.), varg [2014] B.C.J. No.
762 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Appulonappa”].
6
Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 24.
5
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avoid pre-judging the purpose as this tends to short-circuit analysis of the
larger legal issue at hand.7 Appulonappa says little about the importance of
the construction exercise, but devotes 40 paragraphs, easily the longest
of any of the cases, to investigation of the legislative objective. The Court
had noted in that case that the scope of the impugned provision “is plain.
The provision admits of no ambiguity.”8 Since the case consisted of an
overbreadth claim, the result is that construction of the purpose then
becomes dispositive, and therefore its construal comprises most of the
Court’s analysis. As these recent judgments demonstrate, the emergence of
the Rigorous Approach seems to coincide with recognition by the Court —
confirmed in emphatic terms in Markhali — of the decisive importance in
many cases of the construed legislative objective.
(c) Overarching Parameters
Markhali’s Rigorous Approach counsels attention to the theoretical
rationales of the purpose construction, and commands conformity to a
number of overarching parameters for the kind of purpose sought by the
exercise. In this regard, Markhali’s Rigorous Approach reprises, summarizes,
endorses, and extends some of the earlier commentary on these matters
from Moriarity.
One such guideline is that the purpose must be distinguished from
what the legislation actually provides.9 In overbreadth cases, which
compare these two elements, this might seem obvious. But there is a notirrational temptation to avoid diving into the murk of other possible
indicators, and cling to the actual provision as terra firma self-evidence
of its purpose. The Court noted this in Appulonappa, acknowledging that
“[i]t may be argued that since Parliament used these words, that is what it
intended”. However, the Court added that assumption is inadequate for it
fails to consider “...[t]he potential for ‘failures of instrumental
rationality’, in which a given law is not a rational means to achieve a
legislative objective”. The possibility that the law as provided diverged
from its objective requires courts to look further.10 In other words, the
purpose is not always the same as what is provided because sometimes
laws don’t do what they were made to do.
7
8
9
10

Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 32.
Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at para. 72.
Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 26. See also Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 27.
Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at para. 36.
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A second preliminary instruction provided by the Rigorous Approach
for identifying the right kind of legislative object targeted by the exercise
is that it be cast at an appropriate level of generality. High level
constructions in the form of an “animating social value” are to be
avoided for they are substantively too diffuse to usefully explain the
particularity of statutory provisions (think of “the general welfare” as
perhaps an extreme example of a purpose cast at too high of a level of
generality). By the same token, also to be resisted are ground level
constructions that do little more than restate the provision in synonymous
terms, precluding any possible inquiry into differences between
legislative aspiration and instrument.11 The proper pitch of the type of
purpose sought is thus in between.
A third parameter prescribed by Markhali is that the articulated
purpose be in terms “both precise and succinct”.12 The Court gave
several examples in Moriarity of objectives so expressed: protecting
children from becoming victims of sexual offences (Heywood13);
prosecuting and preventing terrorism (Khawaja14); criminalizing the
parasitic, exploitative conduct of pimps (Bedford15); and preventing
vulnerable persons from being induced to commit suicide at a time of
weakness (Carter16). These examples, it said, illustrate how the goal of
the construction exercise is to arrive at an articulated statement of
purpose that captures “the main thrust of the law”.17 It may be wondered
what supports the guidance ensconced in this directive? For starters, the
succinctness criterion obviously contrasts with a more elaborate
statement of purpose. Overly detailed statements of purpose, in turn,
would seem to harbour two opposite risks of distortion: On one hand, if
the extra detail is incorporated from what the law actually does, error
may occur as a result of treating nuances which rather reflect legislative
drafting rationales, practical considerations, or disconnects between
provision and purpose of the “lost in translation” kind as nuances internal
11

Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 27. See also Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 28.
Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 28. See also Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 29.
13
R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.), affg [1992] B.C.J.
No. 2596 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Heywood”].
14
R. v. Khawaja, [2012] S.C.J. No. 69, 2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.), affg
[2010] O.J. No. 5471 (Ont. C.A.).
15
Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3
S.C.R. 1101 (S.C.C.), varg [2012] O.J. No. 1296 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Bedford”].
16
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R.
331 (S.C.C.), revg [2013] B.C.J. No. 2227 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Carter”].
17
Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 26.
12
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to the purpose when in fact they were not. On the other hand, if the extra
detail is imported from other sources of kinds like Parliamentary debates,
public consultations, or international travaux préparatoires, the danger is
that statements made as part of such deliberative processes, but which
did not reflect the overall focus or the final political consensus, may be
improperly treated as if they did. Likewise, if too much detail is
incorporated into the objective from exhaustive legislative preambles, the
risk is that the object of the specific provision at issue may be
misleadingly compounded by expressed objectives which in fact are
focused on other provisions within the larger legislative scheme.
Succinctness therefore guards against the twin risks of either too readily
accepting a provision’s terms as accurately reproducing the provision’s
purpose, or else of overriding the true purpose by over-preoccupation
with statements made in connection with but not reflective of “the main
thrust”. An excessively detailed purpose of either kind could frustrate
Charter analyses like overbreadth or the rational connection and minimal
impairment branches of the Oakes18 proportionality test, as these all
compare in some way what a law was meant to do with what it does.
What of the “precision” that the same directive from Markhali demands
of the articulated purpose, besides succinctness? Just as laws must not be
vague,19 neither can the purpose be, when it is being construed in order to
serve as an intelligible part of some larger legal analysis. And, if that
analysis involves comparisons with what the law actually does, as the
tests for the aforementioned Charter doctrines do, then all the more must
the purpose be articulated precisely to allow for a comparison both full
and fair.
A fourth general rule that Markhali specifies for properly determining
a statutory purpose is that the construction exercise in no way entails
judging the appropriateness of the objective; the objective must be taken
“at face value”.20 This is not to say that statutory purposes are blindly
accepted as being constitutionally appropriate. Indeed, a legislative
object of infringing a Charter right renders the relevant law invalid.21
However, even where the legal issue before the court is precisely that
18
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.), affg [1983] O.J. No. 2501
(Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Oakes”].
19
R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] S.C.J. No. 67, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606
(S.C.C.), affg [1991] N.S.J. No. 169 (N.S.C.A.).
20
Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 29. See also Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 30.
21
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.), affg
[1983] A.J. No. 766 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Big M”].
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question of whether the legislative object violates the Charter, the
purpose must first be construed such as it is, before its compliance with
the Charter can secondarily be assessed.22
Markhali’s Rigorous Approach reveals, besides the above four
enumerated propositions which draw on Moriarity, two additional
guidelines superintending the exercise of construing a statutory purpose.
Both of these reprise features of Appulonappa.
These commence with the place, within the larger legal analysis for
which the purpose is being construed, where the construction should
properly be conducted. Markhali stipulates that it should be done “at the
outset” of the analysis,23 confirming the Court’s earlier depiction of it in
Appulonappa as “the first step”.24 If the larger Charter issue being
analyzed is whether a rights limitation is proportionate, it is clear enough
why construing the purpose must be done at the outset: The first leg of
proportionality analysis asks whether the legislative objective is pressing
and substantial. To answer whether it is pressing and substantial, the
court must first have construed what the legislative objective is. It must
likewise already have been construed to answer the second leg of the
test, which queries whether the provision represents a rational means of
achieving the determined objective. The same is once again true for the
third leg of the test, which asks whether the provision limits the affected
right as little as reasonably possible in pursuing its object. To take
another example, if the legal issue at hand is assessing whether the
purpose of a law is to infringe a Charter right, it will again be necessary
to construe the purpose first. Meanwhile, for certain other Charter
analyses, while it may not be strictly necessary to construe the purpose at
the outset, there would seem strong rationales for doing so. To begin
with, it is the most natural thing to do, since it mimics the legislative
process being scrutinized — where the legislator starts with an objective,
before translating that into legislation, and finally seeing its effects. In
addition, it may help avoid the appearance that a desired outcome on the
overall legal question may have steered the decision as to what the
legislative object was. Consider overbreadth, for example. Moriarity
notes that the means a law adopts “are usually easy to identify”, whereas
22

Id., at paras. 48-53, 72.
Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 24. Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 24, uses the phrase
“at the outset,” but does so in relation to both “purpose and effects.” The point there is that the two
aspects must be determined before they are compared, not that purpose should be construed before
the scope or “effects” are.
24
Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at para. 31.
23
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“[t]he objective of the challenged provision may be more difficult to
identify and articulate.”25 Since the purpose is therefore the more
contestable part, if it is construed after the means have already been
articulated, the outcome will be immediately evident, so that the purpose
construction risks being experienced by the reader like an exercise of
justifying an outcome already in mind, rather than an open-minded and
even-handed analysis. By contrast, if the purpose is construed first,
during which the judgment has to that point been silent as to the scope of
the provision, it tends to create the opposite effect — the iconography of
law, after all, presents justice as blind.
The other, and final, overarching parameter set out by Markhali’s
Rigorous Approach springs from recognition of the fact that complex
legislation often has more than one objective. In Appulonappa, this point
was emphasized on three occasions, and a directive added that in such
case “the way forward lies in an interpretation which harmonizes” the
multiple objectives, “that avoids conflict and gives expression to each...
read together in this way”.26 Markhali does not expressly make the same
point a fourth time, but unmistakably endorses this as an essential
element of properly construing a purpose, as it carries out a lengthy
harmonization process: This begins with acknowledging six isolable
objectives of the legislation at issue in Markhali: public confidence in the
justice system; public safety from chronic/violent offenders; increased
rehabilitation, retribution, transparency in the pre-credit system; and
avoiding manipulation of the system. Over the course of 11 paragraphs,
these are then worked through, providing a concrete illustration of how
the harmonization directive takes shape in a given case.27 Thus, the
public confidence objective is given expression as the animating social
value, but is too general to be the purpose targeted by the construction.
The next two from the above list are combined and together determined
to be the main thrust sought by the construction exercise: “to enhance
public safety and security by increasing violent and chronic offenders’
access to rehabilitation programs.” Conflict with the last three objectives
is resolved by accepting them as valid but peripheral — outside the main
thrust which the construction seeks, in other words. More specifically, it
is noted that retribution occupies a minor role in the ministerial record,

25
26
27

Moriarity, supra, note 3, at paras. 25-26.
Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at paras. 45, 51, 57.
Markhali, supra, note 1, at 37-47.
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while transparency and avoiding manipulation seem more relevant to
measures from the overall scheme other than those centrally at issue.28
Together, the above overarching guidelines provided by Markhali’s
Rigorous Approach operate to help ensure that the often pivotal task of
determining a legislative objective be done in an intensely self-conscious
manner, with awareness of and instructions for avoiding potential
pitfalls, and tips for finding the right kind of purpose that the
construction exercise aims to identify. In all these ways, this general
guidance contributes to a rigorous approach to construing the legislative
object, in contrast to summary approaches used previously.
(d) Mechanics
Besides these overarching parameters, Markhali also gives us the
actual mechanics it endorses for construing a purpose. This includes the
sources to be looked to in determining the purpose, the method by which
to examine them, and the thoroughness with which they should be
investigated. In these respects, Markhali’s Rigorous Approach follows,
formalizes, builds upon, and refines the construction found in
Appulonappa.
(i) Accepted “Indicia of Purpose”29
Markhali expressly enumerates three sets of indicators to be
considered in its Rigorous Approach to construing a statutory purpose:
(i) statements of purpose in the legislation; (ii) the text, legislative
context, and scheme of the legislation; and (iii) the legislative history,
evolution, and other evidence extrinsic to the legislation itself.30 These
same sets of factors can be found in the judgments across the triad
discussed.31 Its earlier cases, Moriarity and Appulonappa, in turn cite as
authority for use of these sources as evidence of legislative purpose
Professor Ruth Sullivan’s leading text on Statutory Interpretation in
Canada, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes.32

28

Id.
Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at para., 34.
30
Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 31.
31
See Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 31, and Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at para. 33.
32
Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed. (Markham: LexisNexis,
2014) [hereinafter “Sullivan”]. See Moriarity, id.; Appulonappa, id.
29
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Examining Markhali’s classification of the indicators to be considered
by its Rigorous Approach, at least two rationales are immediately
apparent. Highlighting them may help to make the analytical structure of
the Approach conceptually more explicit and intelligible to parties to
litigation, and thus easier to recall and adhere to in researching evidence
and presenting arguments concerning the purpose in court. To begin with,
the first two enumerated categories both consist of sources of evidence
intrinsic to the legislation. Statements of objectives in the legislation
comprise direct evidence of purpose intrinsic to the legislation.33 The
text, legislative context, and scheme of the legislation are forms of
indirect evidence of purpose intrinsic to the legislation. The third
category consists of all extrinsic evidence. The extrinsic sources given as
examples and considered in Markhali, namely the history and evolution
of the legislation,34 will each be direct where they pertain to statements
of purpose from the source in question, and indirect where they rely on
other types of statements relevant to the purpose from the source in
question.
As far as the order or logic of enumeration of these categories within
Markhali’s Rigorous Approach, it seems reasonable to conclude based on
ordinary principles of evidence that it reflects a hierarchy of general
reliability: within intrinsic, direct before indirect; all types of intrinsic
before extrinsic; and no need to separate out direct extrinsic from indirect
extrinsic, because their comparative remoteness as extrinsic sources is
their most salient characteristic, diminishing the relative significance of
whether they are direct or indirect. These can only be generalizations,
for in any given case, the reliability of a particular source or category
may be frustrated or magnified. Indeed, in Markhali, although the Court
notes that as a general matter, the sources it draws upon from the third
category “may be rhetorical and imprecise”, it is these sources that, given
the concrete evidence available, become most decisive of the purpose
construed in that particular matter.35
Where do prior case precedents fit amongst the categories? A
precedent’s role appears to vary according to where its relevance lies. If
the precedent contains a conclusion potentially on the overall purpose, it
is dealt with apart from any of the specific categories, so that the court

33
34
35

Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 32 uses the term “explicit” to similar effect.
Id., at para. 31.
Id., at para. 36.
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can investigate whether the purpose is “settle[d]” by stare decisis.36 If the
precedent contains conclusions relevant to only one or more of the
categories of evidence of purpose, it is considered within the examination
of those, as for instance the Summers precedent is in Markhali.37
Elaborating in more detail, now, the content of each of the categories
of the Rigorous Approach, the legislative statements of purpose that
comprise the first category may be found at the beginning of a statute, in
the section in which the provision in question is found, in sections
containing interpretive guidelines, or in amendments to the statute.38 This
category has been called the first,39 “most direct and authoritative
evidence” of legislative purpose.40 However, it does not always yield
clear answers in practice. For example, in Markhali, the Court looked at
this source, but found no statement of objectives in the legislation.41
Meanwhile, in Appulonappa, the legislation contained multiple
statements of purpose, which the Court sought to harmonize,42 a difficult
task which sometimes requires resort in turn to the other categories of
sources for illumination.
The second category consists of the “contextual matrix”43 of the
purpose that is still intrinsic to the legislation. Under this rubric,
Markhali, for instance, scrutinized the Criminal Code provision on
endorsement where detainees are denied bail due to prior convictions
(section 515(9.1)).44 This endorsement provision was the key element of
the legislative context of the impugned provision (section 719(3.1))
which capped credit for pre-sentence custody in the event of such an
36
See discussion in Moriarity, supra, note 3, at paras. 42-44, 47 of R. v. Généreux, [1992]
S.C.J. No. 10, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259 (S.C.C.), revg [1990] C.M.A.J. No. 1 (C.M.A.C.).
37
Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 34. The statements from R. v. Summers, [2014] S.C.J.
No. 26, 2016 SCC 26 (S.C.C.), are considered within the second category of indirect intrinsic
evidence. Arguably, they should have been considered in the first category, since the statements in
question are statements of purpose which the Summers Court imputed to the legislation. However, as
the Markhali Court notes that the construction was part of an exercise of broader statutory
interpretation, the Markhali Court may have had in mind Summers wider commentary on the scheme
in placing it in that category.
38
Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at paras. 49, 53-54.
39
Markhali, supra, note 1, at paras. 31, 32.
40
Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at para. 49, quoting Sullivan, supra, note 32, at 274-76.
41
Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 32. The case does make reference to the title of the Act,
but without obtaining great illumination. The titles to certain statutes would seem to fall in between
statements of purpose and legislative context, which may explain why this source is referred to
where it is within Markhali’s analysis.
42
Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at paras. 45, 49-57.
43
Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 33.
44
Id., at para. 35; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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endorsement. While it may seem puzzling that the Court also referred to
its scrutiny of the endorsement provision rather than the cap provision as
the “text” factor, the latter incorporated by reference the former, whose
breadth was in question in its triggering the cap’s effects, as the Court
explained earlier.45 Both prior cases of the triad also saw the text and
legislative context considered (separately, in each case) within this
category of sources recognized by the Rigorous Approach.46
The third category under the Rigorous Approach consists of evidence
extrinsic to the actual and current legislation. This includes materials
closely related to the legislation, such as prior versions of it, or minutes
from the debates and committee meetings that led to it. Of the first
of these, the Court in Markhali looked to but found little evidence of
legislative evolution.47 An example of such an analysis can be found,
however, in Appulonappa, where the Court scrutinizes successive
changes in the prohibitions on migrant smuggling dating back a century,
and derives from this evolution an increasing desire by the legislator to
distinguish between incidental or humanitarian forms of aid versus
crime-related activities contributing to the entry of undocumented
migrants.48 Turning to the legislative history, it is this factor that
Markhali considers at greatest length,49 finding in the records of
Parliamentary committee meetings evidence showing an objective of
bolstering public safety by enhancing rehabilitation for violent and
chronic offenders.50 The Court had, as mentioned, acknowledged the
perils of Hansard evidence, but these perils may have been partially
muted by the Court’s particular focus on explanations by the minister
responsible, rather than other potentially less reliable comments from the
Parliamentary record. In this respect, the Court said: “providing
information and explanations of proposed legislation is an important
ministerial responsibility, and courts rightly look to it in determining the
purpose”.51 Both Moriarity and Appulonappa also examined the
Parliamentary debate history.52 Another extrinsic source is international
45

Id., at paras. 10-11.
Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 36 (text) and paras. 36-40 (legislative context);
Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at paras. 35-39 (text) and paras. 46-48 (legislative context).
47
Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 36.
48
Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at paras. 58-63. For another example, see Big M, supra, note
21, at paras. 48-53.
49
Markhali, supra, note 1, at paras. 36-44.
50
Id., at para. 47.
51
Id., at para. 36.
52
Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 45; Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at paras. 64-69.
46
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law. The Court investigated this factor in Appulonappa, explaining that
“[w]here legislation is enacted in the context of international
commitments, international law may also be of assistance” in construing
the legislative object.53 In combination, these sources remain far from
exhaustive of the category of extrinsic materials, as Moriarity noted,
observing that “[c]ourts have used many sources to determine legislative
purpose”.54 For instance, in Chartrand,55 which Appulonappa cites,
L’Heureux-Dubé J. looked at the social context in which the enactment
was made, referencing, for example, academic texts and governmentpublished relevant statistical evidence.56 Whether the new Rigorous
Approach inaugurated by Markhali will stretch far enough to encompass
these forms of extrinsic sources or others is yet to be determined.
Beyond the above catalogue of sources, it is important to note that it is
a holistic approach to the combined import of all the various sources that
enables the purpose to emerge using the Rigorous Approach.57 Alone, each
source has its own frailties, as Moriarity points out, noting, for instance,
that “as Prof. Sullivan wisely observes, legislative statements of purpose
may be vague and incomplete, and inferences of legislative purpose [from
indirect sources] may be subjective and prone to error”.58
(ii) Manner in Which to Analyze the Sources
Markhali also reveals the manner in which the sources are to be
analyzed under the Rigorous Approach. Here, Markhali departs from the
analytical structure used earlier in Moriarity.
Moriarity employed an analytical structure of: (i) addressing the
appellants’ position on the purpose; (ii) addressing the respondents’
position on the purpose; and lastly (iii) stating the Court’s conclusion as
to the purpose.59 Within this structure, the sources are turned to and
discussed in relation to the parties’ contentions regarding them.60 Where
the court responds to both parties’ contentions concerning the same
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Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at paras. 33, 40-44.
Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 31.
55
R. v. Chartrand, [1994] S.C.J. No. 67, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 864, at 880-82 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Chartrand”].
56
Id.
57
See, for example, Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 32 referring to the “full context”.
58
Id., at para. 31.
59
Id., at paras. 34-48.
60
Id., at paras. 35-45.
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source, this requires the court to return to the source a second time. Thus,
for example, in Moriarity, the Généreux precedent is discussed under the
section pertaining to the appellants and again that of the respondents.61 In
Moriarity, the lower court’s assertions were also looked at — together
with the appellants’ because of similarity in their positions.62 Had their
positions been more different, or had interveners been present and taken
again quite different positions, it is uncertain whether the analysis would
have required sections for each, considering the same sources of
indicators of purpose each time. At the end of the sections containing the
expressions of and responses to the parties’ positions and arguments
regarding the sources, Moriarity then stated the Court’s own view of the
purpose in a concluding paragraph.63
By contrast, Markhali follows an analytical structure that corresponds
to its enumerated categorization of the authoritative sources: (i) legislative
statements of purpose; (ii) the text, legislative context and scheme; and
(iii) extrinsic sources.64 A single comprehensive analysis of each source
is conducted, following the enumerated order, each in turn.65 The central
focus is simply on emergent implications for the purpose that the court
must construe, rather than on seeking evidence from the sources that
supports or refutes the parties’ claims regarding it.66 Nevertheless,
inevitably, within the analysis of each source, the examination and
discussion of the sources does implicitly (and sometimes quite directly,
sometimes less directly) respond to the positions of the parties and lower
courts. Occasionally the analysis may also do so explicitly, as we see in
Appulonappa, which employed a similar analytical structure, but lacked
the canonical formulation and adherence to the prescribed order of
consideration of sources additionally incorporated into the Rigorous
Approach set out in Markhali.67
The analytical structure in Markhali is rigorous in that the structure
inherently concentrates attention on all sources, and on all evidence of
purpose attainable from each source, diminishing the risk of overlooking
some source or some relevant evidence from a source. This is particularly
important given the parties’ inherent interest in proposing self-serving
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id., at paras. 41-44, 47.
Id., at paras. 34-46.
Id., at para. 48.
Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 31.
Id., at paras. 32-44.
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Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at paras. 36, 52-54.
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positions, which may well turn out sometimes to be opposite extremes —
as the Court indeed concluded the parties’ positions were in Moriarity.68
Further, from case to case, more consistent results are likely to be
achieved through an analytical scheme focused on the authoritative
sources rather than parties’ arguments. The approach is also rigorous in
discharging the court’s obligation of justification: unlike the partyfocused analytical scheme, where the discussion focuses on rejecting the
parties’ contentions, Markhali’s source-focused analytical scheme leads
to and supports the Court’s ultimate conclusion in which the analysis
culminates. In all these respects, the analytical structure of Markhali’s
approach to purpose construction parallels the accepted rigorous
approaches to statutory interpretation.
(iii) Depth of Analysis
Markhali’s Rigorous Approach is also marked by its consideration
of the relevant indicators in a depth that befits the Supreme Court’s
recognition of the “critical importance” of purpose constructions in
many cases. While in Markhali itself, few of the consulted sources in
fact disclosed relevant evidence, this depth was demonstrated through
the comprehensive and meticulous examination of the legislative
history. The Court devoted 10 paragraphs to its scrutiny, quoting the
record six times, harmonizing conflicting pieces of evidence, posing
and answering questions about the best ways of interpreting that
evidence.69 Blessed with access to more types of relevant evidence, one
finds in Appulonappa a fuller picture of the thoroughness that
characterizes the Rigorous Approach endorsed in Markhali. The Court
in that case having identified, as mentioned earlier, the purpose as the
central legal issue to be analyzed, careful inquiry attends each source.
Thus, for example, it provides an average of six paragraphs to each of
the authoritative sources available: legislative statements of object, the
text, the legislative context, legislative evolution, legislative history,
and international law.70
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Moriarity, supra, note 3, at paras. 20-21, 47.
Markhali, supra, note 1, at paras. 36-44, 47.
70
Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at paras. 49-57 (legislative statements of object), paras. 3539 (text), paras. 46-48 (legislative context), paras. 58-63 (legislative evolution), paras. 64-69
(legislative history), and paras. 40-45 (international law).
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2. The Summary Approach
(a) The Old Regime
The Rigorous Approach to purpose construction laid down in
Markhali contrasts with the typical practice of Canadian courts prior to
the Markhali triad. While one can find considerable variability in the
specific analysis used in one or another of the older cases, generallyspeaking — and beyond inevitable exceptions71 — these share a number
of common features which in combination describe a Summary
Approach opposite of the Rigorous Approach. The diversity of these
cases and contexts makes choosing a truly representative set impossible.
Thus, in order to illustrate these points, I draw on three example cases —
Heywood,72 Law,73 and Lola74 — that at least exhibit different modes of
analysis in construals used for different Charter doctrines, but in all of
which, the construed purpose was pivotal to the outcome of the case.
(b) Three Examples
Heywood is the seminal case on overbreadth, whereby the constitutional
validity of a law hangs on a comparison between legislative means and
objective. The judgment was a 5:4 split, where the majority and the
dissent disagreed on the object, and as a result, on whether the law was
unconstitutional. Those implications riding on it, the majority’s purpose
analysis consisted of a conclusory statement and invocation of the text,
articulated, in one instance, as follows:
The purpose of s. 179(1)(b) is to protect children from becoming victims
of sexual offences. This is apparent from the prohibition which applies to
places where children are very likely to be found.75

A very similar, but slightly longer, passage listed the places in
question.76 The dissent’s more substantial purpose analysis focused
71
See, for example, Chartrand, supra, note 55; R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986]
S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at paras. 62-70 (S.C.C.), varg [1984] O.J. No. 3379 (Ont. C.A.).
72
Heywood, supra, note 13.
73
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999]
1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.), affg [1996] F.C.J. No. 511 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Law”].
74
Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, [2013] S.C.J. No. 5, 2013 SCC 5, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 61
(S.C.C.), popularly better known as Eric v. Lola [hereinafter “Lola”].
75
Heywood, supra, note 13, at 794.
76
Id., at 786.
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predominantly on expert witness testimony,77 a source whose status is
uncertain as yet under the new regime introduced in Markhali.
Law, an important case in the development of the Supreme Court’s
equality jurisprudence, was notable in its repeated highlighting of the
importance of the legislative objective to whether differential treatment is
discriminatory.78 The case made no mention, however, of the importance
of how that purpose is construed. The outcome in Law in fact came down
to the statutory purpose construed by the Court. Analysis of the purpose
consisted of stating the positions of the claimant and the government, and
then asserting the Court’s conclusion.79 Sources mentioned were Hansard
proffered by the claimant,80 the claimant’s admission before the Court
that she agreed with part of the Government’s position,81 and judicial
notice taken by the Court, supported by precedents.82 There were in fact
two ways in which the object thus construed resulted in rejection of the
claim in Law. One was that denying younger widow(er)s a survivor
benefit available to older widow(er)s did not substantively discriminate
against younger ones because they were better able to replace the income
of a deceased spouse on their own over the long-term, and the statutory
aim, as asserted by the Government and accepted by the Court, was longterm not immediate need.83 The other was that the Court construed the
legislation as having an objective of ameliorating the situation of older
widow(er)s, a group which the Court concluded through judicial notice
was in greater need than younger ones.84 Under the test applied, such a
purpose was a factor in whether legislation was discriminatory.85
Lola was a case concerning unmarried spouses’ obligations, where the
purpose was key not only to whether the scheme breached the right to
non-discrimination, but also whether the infringement of that right was
proportionate. The Court was split in four different opinions. Justice
LeBel and McLachlin C.J.C. saw the objective as couples’ autonomy to
choose the regime of spousal obligations they prefer, while Abella J.
concluded that the objective was protecting vulnerable spouses, and
Deschamps J. construed some of the provisions as autonomist and some
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id., at 808-11.
Law, supra, note 73.
Id., at paras. 96-104.
Id., at para. 97.
Id., at para. 100.
Id., at para. 101.
Id., at para. 98.
Id., at paras. 101-104.
Id., at paras. 72-73, 88.
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protective.86 Justice LeBel’s discussion did not clearly distinguish its
analysis of purpose versus content versus effects; as regards the purpose,
it was also preoccupied with whether the purpose was discriminatory,
without independently construing the purpose.87 The evidence most
related to the objective comprised a case precedent and the legislative
history.88 While Abella J.’s opinion had recourse to numerous sources
(the legislative context, academic commentaries, law commission
reports, precedents, law and jurisprudence from other jurisdictions,
legislative history, social history), the analytical structure governing its
examination of them was unclear as it moved back and forth among
them. Also unknown was what relative authority or weight the analysis
gave to the different categories of sources, although law commission
reports and cases from outside jurisdictions figured prominently.89 The
case outcome came down to the opinion of McLachlin C.J.C., whose
conclusion that the scheme was discriminatory in effect though not in
purpose created a 5:4 majority that found a prima facie infringement, but
whose conclusion that the infringement was proportionate produced a 5:4
majority upholding the legislation. At the pivotal minimal impairment
step of proportionality analysis, a subtle difference in construed purpose
was decisive: While Abella and Deschamps JJ. pointed to ways one
could preserve autonomy while impairing the section 15(1) right less, the
Chief Justice noted that these didn’t satisfy the test, for they distorted the
statutory objective, being to provide couples not merely some measure of
autonomy but maximizing their autonomy.90
(c) Common Features
Common to these three example cases are features of the Summary
Approach that dominated purpose construction in the jurisprudence prior
to the Markhali triad.
For starters, they lack a robust self-consciousness about the
construction exercise and its importance. Even when the importance of
86
Lola, supra, note 74, at paras. 254-257 (LeBel J.), paras. 413, 435-436, 442 (McLachlin
C.J.C.), e.g., paras. 283-284, 294ff. (Abella J.), paras. 386-392 (Deschamps J.).
87
Id.: see reasons of LeBel J. generally (paras. 1-282); see also para. 424.
88
Id., at paras. 207-226, 256 (Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh, [2002] S.C.J. No. 84,
2002 SCC 83 (S.C.C.) precedent) and paras. 105-110 (legislative history).
89
Id.: see reasons of Abella J. generally, at paras. 283-381. The opinions in the two
remaining sets of reasons rely significantly on the analyses in the two aforementioned ones, and do
not otherwise differ sharply in their approach to construing the legislative objective.
90
Id., at paras. 442-447.
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the purpose is recognized, as it is implicitly by the dissent in Heywood,
and explicitly by all in both Law and Lola, no similar recognition is
apparent as regards the construction.
The overarching parameters of the Rigorous Approach, designed to
focus attention on the theoretical rationales of the construction exercise
while keeping a wary eye out for practical pitfalls, are therefore notably
absent from the Summary Approach. Hence, in Lola, the legislative
object and effects are regularly conflated by three of the four opinions,
even while a conclusion by the fourth opinion that the legislation is
discriminatory in effect but not in purpose is what decides the case
outcome. In Law, we see the two aspects of the construed purpose cast in
too general terms — older versus younger widow(er)s, ameliorative
purpose versus lessening dignity — to actually rule out the nuance
suggested by the claimant: that the statutory aim was to ameliorate the
situation of those widow(er)s most in need91 (including long-term), and
that this would include not just older widow(er)s but also a subclass of
younger widow(er)s not far from the age threshold and having other
characteristics pushing them into the group most necessitous whose
situation the aim was to ameliorate. The legislation’s distinction by age
would thus discriminate in effect, though not purpose, in the same way
McLachlin C.J.C. concluded that the claimant suffered discrimination in
Lola. If this is so, Law should have instead been resolved at the
proportionality stage, the infringement justified on the basis that a too
complicated system of determining need would make the whole
ameliorative scheme unworkable. Returning to Lola, the dissenting
opinions’ insufficient appreciation of the need for precision regarding the
purpose led them at the minimal impairment stage to rest their position
on the possibility of alternate schemes that would lessen the infringement
but also lessen autonomy, thus posing no challenge to a majority that had
concluded that the legislative objective was to maximize autonomy.
Again in Lola, the abiding preoccupation in LeBel J.’s reasons with
judging the purpose as innocent of any discriminatory intent overlooked,
even as it provided a voluminous and expert survey of the legislative
background, the possibility that an objectively-presented clear
construction of the purpose may have done more to persuade, and
resulted in a less fractured Court. In Heywood, the cursory manner in
which the majority addressed the critical question of the purpose was
likely in part because it was done in the middle of, and as part of,
91
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interpreting the statute, rather than construing the objective first,
whereby its importance to analyzing and justifying a conclusion on
overbreadth would presumably have encouraged a more substantial
analysis. Lastly, the potential flaw in Law alluded to earlier could likely
have been avoided had the Court tasked itself with harmonizing longterm need as an aspect of the purpose with the aspect of intending to help
those most in need, a more nuanced group than just older versus younger,
being the kind of generalization on an enumerated ground (age) that one
expects should only be upheld where justified via section 1 of the Charter
(or, where applicable, the affirmative action provision, section 15(2)).
The example cases also illustrate how the mechanics of the Summary
Approach diverge from those of Markhali’s Rigorous Approach. As
detailed, the opinions examined few sources of evidence of purpose. The
exception to that was Abella J.’s reasons in Lola. Those reasons considered
some of the indicia of purpose recognized as authoritative by the
Markhali triad, but also some factors (law commission reports, law and
jurisprudence from outside the jurisdiction, academic commentaries,
social history) not yet considered under the Markhali regime. Likewise
uncertain is what recourse the Rigorous Approach may or may not permit
to expert witness testimony, a focus of the Heywood dissent. What these
preceding comments further reveal is the disparity and unpredictability
of which factors, besides the number of factors, the Summary Approach
might call upon in purpose constructions. Beyond the sources, the
example cases illustrate how the Summary Approach eschews analytical
structure in the purpose construction — including where the same cases
do strongly adhere to that characteristic in interpreting the statute itself.
Further, the Summary Approach is widely inconsistent, but typically
incomplete, in its commitment to examining any particular source.
Overall the analysis is often cursory. Where it is not, its length frequently
comprises long descriptive passages on, for instance the legislative
history, rarely interrupted by analysis, which is instead left to a summary
statement at the end of it.
In sum, the qualities that define the Rigorous Approach — reflective,
cautious, comprehensive, disciplined, and analytically deep — are absent
from the Summary Approach. The latter’s opposite qualities could be
cast in virtuous terms — simple, quick, free, flexible, and efficient. But
they could also be seen, in comparison both to the Rigorous Approach to
purpose construction, and to the much longer-endorsed rigorous
approaches to statutory interpretation, as far too “fast and loose”.
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW RIGOROUS APPROACH TO
PURPOSE CONSTRUCTION FOR FUTURE
CHARTER JURISPRUDENCE
1. Some Notable Charter Analyses Potentially Impacted by the
New Approach
The advent of a new approach to purpose construction may impact a
number of legal analyses prescribed by Canadian Charter jurisprudence
within which statutory purpose plays an important role. The following
are a few noteworthy examples.
(a) Overbreadth
Overbreadth directly compares the scope of a law with its object,
so that any law the doctrine is applicable to will be declared
unconstitutional if that “law goes too far and interferes with some
conduct that bears no connection to its objective.”92 A principle of
fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter, it applies to any law
which may impinge on an individual’s life, liberty or security interests.
Though its early career was relatively inauspicious, overbreadth
has emerged in recent years as one of the most potent bases for
challenging legislation under the Charter. Some prominent examples
of its successful invocation by claimants in recent years include
Bedford (prostitution), Carter93 (assisted suicide), Appulonappa (human
smuggling), and Markhali (sentencing). Since it is unlikely that a law
which fails section 7 can be saved under section 1, 94 a successful claim
need only show the said disparity between the object and scope of the
relevant legislation. As Markhali and Moriarity noted, the construed
purpose then becomes critically important to the subtle comparison that
answers the question of the legislation’s validity, while the analysis that
led to it becomes equally important to a court’s justification of that
conclusion. It is surely no coincidence, therefore, that it was within a
line of cases concerning overbreadth that the Rigorous Approach
emerged, with the careful attention and systematic investigation the

92
93
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Bedford, supra, note 15, at para. 101.
Carter, supra, note 16.
Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 57.
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Approach brings to the question of the statutory objective. Notably, this
Rigorous Approach does not appear to have altered in any way the
substantive threshold that must be met. Both Markhali and
Appulonappa saw laws declared overbroad, while in Moriarity the law
was upheld. Rather, as with the similar rigour that guides accepted
approaches to statutory interpretation, what Markhali’s approach offers
is greater confidence — both at the stage of investigation, and at the
stage of justification — that whatever conclusion is reached on the
purpose is correct.
(b) Discrimination
Whether differential treatment prescribed by law is discriminatory
under the Charter’s section 15(1) right to equality depends, besides
effects, on the objective of the law. The Law and Lola cases discussed
earlier were both examples where the legislative object played a pivotal
role in the resolution of the overall discrimination claim at bar. Another
prominent example was Children’s Foundation,95 where the majority
deemed that exempting the use of corrective force on children from
assault laws was not discriminatory, because it was for the purpose of
the guidance, discipline, and education of children.96 Meanwhile, the
dissenting opinions viewed the objective as instead relating to relieving
the liability of the adults who may be called upon to use such force.97
Under the current test for discrimination, the second step asks
whether the differential treatment perpetuates prejudice or disadvantage,
whether by effect or purpose.98 In cases where it is the purpose that is
impugned, it is therefore crucial, in answering whether it perpetuates
prejudice or disadvantage, how the purpose is construed. Hard cases, like
those mentioned, magnify the importance of that construal. In such cases,
the Rigorous Approach introduced by Markhali provides greater security
that the purpose will be accurately determined and thoroughly justified.

95
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General),
[2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 2004 SCC 4, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.), affg [2002] O.J. No. 61 (Ont. C.A.).
96
Id., at para. 59.
97
Id., e.g., at para. 102 (Binnie J., dissenting in part) and paras. 228-232 (Deschamps J.,
dissenting).
98
R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, at para. 17 (S.C.C.),
affg [2006] B.C.J. No. 1273 (B.C.C.A.); Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J.
No. 12, 2011 SCC 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396, at para. 20 (S.C.C.), affg [2008] B.C.J. No. 2507
(B.C.C.A.).
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(c) Proportionality
The most far-reaching section of the Charter is section 1, by which
limitations of the other rights may be justified and thus upheld, failing
which the law creating the limitation is otherwise unconstitutional. The
justifiability of such limitations is determined by the proportionality
analysis ordained in Oakes.99 The first three of the Oakes test’s four
steps all depend on the statutory objective: The first inquires whether
that objective is pressing and substantial. The second queries whether it
is rationally connected to the legislative means supposed to give it effect.
The third step, long the lynchpin of justification under Oakes, asks
whether the limit is a minimal impairment of the right, given the
legislative purpose. In practice, the question there is whether the measure
falls “within a range of reasonable alternatives” for attaining the
purpose,100 in consideration of the extent of its collateral impairment of
the right. To answer any of these questions, the legislative object must be
construed. A sound and defensible purpose construal is thus essential to
all three of these steps of proportionality analysis. And it is of maximal
importance at the pivotal stage of minimal impairment, where the
outcome turns on an often subtle judgment of whether a given limitation
puts a scheme on this or that side of the outer bound of reasonable
alternatives for attaining the object. This was evident in the deciding of
the Lola case, described earlier. The thoroughness of the Rigorous
Approach offers perhaps its greatest promise in proportionality analysis,
where a fair and accurate account of the objective undergirds what will
inescapably require a difficult and delicate balancing of individual and
communal interests, comparing at the pivotal step the interests sacrificed
as part of the limitation on the individual’s right with the societal
interests that it is the purpose of the legislation to advance.
It should be noted that in claims of types where the objective has
already had to be construed before reaching the justification stage, it can
then be reused, without the exercise needing to be repeated. This is
evident from Markhali where the Court seized the opportunity at the
justification stage to rely on the object it had construed earlier using the
Rigorous Approach at the overbreadth stage.101
99

Oakes, supra, note 18.
Lola, supra, note 74, at para. 439; Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony,
[2009] S.C.J. No. 37, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, at para. 37 (S.C.C.), revg [2007] A.J.
No. 518 (Alta. C.A.).
101
Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 59.
100

246

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2017) 77 S.C.L.R. (2d)

(d) Other Charter Analyses
The preceding serve only as a few examples of how often questions of
statutory purpose are central in Charter jurisprudence. This in turn
suggests the need to adhere to a Markhali-style Rigorous Approach in
these purpose constructions, much as similarly-rigorous approaches to
statutory interpretation are invariably followed where the meaning of
legislation is at issue.
Additional examples of such issues can be provided. For example,
some Charter claims involve an allegation that the object of a law is to
infringe a right — such as freedom of religion or expression.102 It is then
essential to accurately construe the legislation in order to answer whether
such was or was not the intent. Also, analysis governing the section 8 right
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure requires, at the second
step, that the authorizing law be reasonable. This in turn prescribes a
balancing of the societal objectives of the law with the intrusion on the
privacy interests of the individual affected.103 An accurate and reliable
construal of the legislative objectives behind the search or seizure is thus
again invaluable. In the Charter jurisprudence on freedom of expression,
the threshold for a prima facie infringement is, apart from violence, so low
that almost invariably the question immediately turns to proportionality. As
a result, most of the Charter doctrine proprietary to the speech right is in
fact analyzed as a matter of adjusting the threshold for justification. An
aspect of this doctrine is the type of speech at issue: the justification
threshold is lower for speech at the periphery of the right such as hate
speech versus speech near the core of the right such as political speech.104
Accordingly, it is important to carefully identify and characterize the type
of speech that the legislation targets for restriction, in the service of
whatever larger purpose the legislation serves. The line can be subtle, as
cases involving political advertising,105 pornography,106 and the propagation
102

See, e.g., Big M, supra, note 21 (religion); R. v. Zundel, [1992] S.C.J. No. 70, [1992] 2
S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.), revg [1990] O.J. No. 122 (Ont. C.A.) (expression).
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[2014] A.J. No. 739 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Fearon, [2014] S.C.J. No. 77, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R.
621, at paras. 44-45 (S.C.C.), affg [2013] O.J. No. 704 (Ont. C.A.).
104
See, e.g., Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] S.C.J. No. 11,
2013 SCC 11, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467, at paras. 112-120 (S.C.C.), varg [2010] S.J. No. 108 (Sask. C.A.)
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revg [1999] B.C.J. No. 1555 (B.C.C.A.).
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of discriminatory ideologies,107 for example, have demonstrated. The
Rigorous Approach to legislative purpose construction introduced by
Markhali may aid these Charter analyses as well.
2. Implications of the New Rigorous Approach
The new Rigorous Approach to purpose construction may bring a
number of important benefits to the adjudication of Charter cases where
the statutory purpose is a significant issue.
(a) Accuracy and Reliability
Markhali’s Rigorous Approach may be expected to reduce the chance
of error by courts charged with construing a purpose. Several facets of
the Approach contribute to this likelihood. To begin with, the Approach’s
express recognition of the “critical importance” of the construction
encourages a court to discharge the obligation implicit in that importance
by demonstrating a high quality construal. Further, the Approach’s
overarching parameters anchor attention on the theoretical rationales
guiding a proper construal, and point out specific common pitfalls that
may ensnare less-than-careful efforts. Moreover, the mechanics of the
construction — including a categorized set of authoritative sources, a
structure that seeks each source’s available evidence rather than
reproducing each party’s arguments, a prescribed order of analysis tied to
general principles of evidential reliability, and an analytical depth in
considering the evidence from each source — together produce a
comprehensive, systematic, and thorough construction. A construal with
these features is far less likely to overlook a source or available evidence
from the source, to be led off course by self-serving party positions, or to
provide only a superficial examination of the evidence, leading to error.
This is at the core of what marks the approach as “rigorous”.
(b) Consistency
Because the Rigorous Approach sets out the authoritative sources and
the prescribed steps to follow in construing a purpose from them, it
should produce more consistent results than the pre-Markhali regime
107
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where the sources consulted and process followed radically varied court
to court and case to case. This in turn should decrease the need for
appellate courts to revisit and revise lower courts’ purpose constructions,
and therefore also the burden on them of doing so.
(c) Transparency and Predictability for Parties to Disputes
Since the Rigorous Approach employs a prescribed format explicitly
laid out in Markhali, it offers greater transparency regarding the process
used to construe a purpose. This also makes the basis upon which it can
be expected to decide a statutory objective more predictable. Meanwhile,
the greater consistency of results also makes results more predictable.
Together, these facets of greater predictability should enable parties to
assess their prospects in advance of going to court or even of commencing
litigation, and to plan accordingly. Even a slight decrease in trials of
these typically quite “heavy” cases might be welcome, as far as doing its
share, given an overburdened court system and its consequent costs in
access to justice for parties. Where a judgment has been rendered, the
same qualities of predictability and transparency apply to what the
judgment can be expected to provide by way of justification, diminishing
the likelihood of surprise and any resulting sense of unfairness. Again,
this in turn may somewhat reduce the frequency of appeal from the class
of relevant cases.
(d) Better Adversarial Debate Regarding the Purpose
In our party-driven legal system, court judgments are generally as
good as the adversarial debate that informs them. In this regard, the
Rigorous Approach to purpose construction should guide and discipline
the evidence and arguments that litigants bring to court to support their
position on the legislative object. It won’t do for a party to cherry-pick
one self-serving statement from the legislative history, and ignore
other authoritative sources. Over time, the iterative sequence of litigants
responding to the feedback of courts’ future applications of the Rigorous
Approach is likely to lead to case records boasting progressively better
and more complete evidence of purpose, and sounder argumentation and
counter-argumentation regarding it. This will facilitate the best possible
adjudication by courts of claims involving statutory objective.
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(e) Clearer Guidance to Legislatures
In our system of government with its separation of powers and
judicial review checking unconstitutional action by the state’s democratic
organs, Markhali’s Rigorous Approach to purpose construction may
significantly improve “communications” between legislatures and courts.
Because the Rigorous Approach is both transparent and consistent,
legislatures should generally be better-equipped to appreciate what
makes laws unconstitutionally overbroad, discriminatory in purpose,
unjustifiable in their rights limitations etc. This will encourage
legislatures to be much more clear about the legislative object, within the
authoritative sources that courts look to as indicia under the Rigorous
Approach. This in turn would alleviate courts being so often in situations
like that of Markhali: having to construe the purpose — with the
constitutionality of the law riding on it — with useful evidence absent
from most of the sources, and the legislative history containing a
diversity of conflicting statements related to objectives which the court
must harmonize. The clearer “feedback” that the Rigorous Approach
provides legislatures about what makes laws overbroad, discriminatory
in object, disproportionate limitations of rights etc. should equally help
legislatures tailor the end opposite the purpose in such comparisons
(e.g., the legislation itself, the limit it effects on a right, etc.). There are two
reasons for this. The first is that, because the legislature, as mentioned, will
strive to make the objective itself clearer, it will therefore have a clearer
benchmark to keep the legislation and its effects in correspondence
with it as it goes through the drafting process. Second, if draft legislation
or its effects start to lose that correspondence as the drafting process
progresses, it will be more clearly and immediately apparent to legal
counsel advising on the drafting process, thus making it easier for
corrective action to be taken by the legislature before enactment,
litigation, judicial review, and invalidation (at such great cost in
resources) ultimately provide the same feedback.
(f) Public Confidence in the Rule of Law and the Integrity of Courts
Because the Rigorous Approach offers more thorough analysis
and justification, greater transparency and consistency, improved
communications and diminished conflict between legislatures as
democratic organs and courts as guardians of the Constitution, it
consequently contributes to enhancing public confidence in the integrity
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of the justice system. Conclusory purpose constructions inevitably give
the impression of being arbitrary and lacking in legal justification.
Meanwhile, ad hoc purpose constructions at the centre of judgments
upholding or striking down legislation respecting controversial matters
have at times even led to inflammatory accusations of either legislative
apology-making, on the one hand, or activism on the other.108 The
Rigorous Approach, because it prescribes in advance the manner in
which it will construe the objective, focuses in so doing on the sources
rather than the parties, and is comprehensive and thorough, produces an
opposite impression: that of an exercise based profoundly in law at every
step, and applied with mechanistic impartiality. It is useful once again, to
look by analogy at the closely related matter of statutory interpretation.
In substance, it is an exercise that could generate constant controversy,
undermining the integrity and function of courts, on grounds of alleged
legislative re-drafting. Instead, the rigour that has long characterized
any of the generally accepted approaches to statutory interpretation —
which, as mentioned, are analogous to and intersect the Rigorous
Approach to purpose construction — results in statutory interpretation
being perceived by outsiders as the epitome of a “dry” exercise in neutral
application of legal technique by specially-trained experts. So too may
Markhali’s Rigorous Approach do for purpose construction, where
the charge sometimes otherwise levelled is one of revisionist policymaking. For these reasons, Markhali’s Rigorous Approach to purpose
construction strengthens the Rule of Law and helps shelter courts from
allegations of overreaching.

IV. SOME REMAINING ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED REGARDING
THE NEW RIGOROUS APPROACH TO
PURPOSE CONSTRUCTION
1. When to Use the Rigorous Approach versus the Summary
Approach
Not surprisingly given the newness of the Rigorous Approach, some
issues around it remain to be worked out over future cases.
108
For the latter, see, e.g., “Judicial Activism in Canada: Charter Fights”, The Economist
(July 7, 2014). For the former, see, e.g., George Jonas, “Supreme Court puts the final nail in the
coffin of religious freedom”, National Post (February 28, 2012).
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One of these is the question of when the Rigorous Approach is called
for, versus when the Summary Approach might be adequate or appropriate.
In addressing it, the Supreme Court will first have to decide whether it
prefers to take an anticipatory approach to that question and answer it
expressly, or to let actions speak for themselves in resolving the question
implicitly and incrementally. As I see it, the first approach would be better
in this instance in order to support the rationales served by the
promulgation of a Rigorous Approach in the first place. Specifically, in the
absence of a rule for when the Rigorous Approach applies, its ad hoc use
and non-use will appear arbitrary, undermining the Rule of Law and
leading to complaints about equal (procedural) justice. By contrast, if a
rule is presented, it can always be revised as new insights gradually
emerge. This refinement is our court system’s very stock-in-trade.
Regarding the rule itself, like any rule of law, it should embody a
rationality that explains the effects it produces, and must be adhered to
consistently. A sensible and flexible startpoint might be a rule that the
Rigorous Approach is required wherever the purpose is a significant
issue before the court, whether on its own (such as where it is alleged
that the object is to infringe a Charter right), or else as part of a larger
legal issue before the court (such as in the examples given in Part III). By
contrast, if the purpose is only to be cited as background or context, as
relevant but not significant evidence, or as an element of a larger claim
the whole of which the court does not consider to merit full
consideration, then the Summary Approach may be more appropriate in
such cases for reasons of expediency. As to whether a standard based on
the significance of the objective to the outcome is capable of consistent
adjudication, it seems to be that it is the kind of decision courts must
constantly and inevitably decide in weighing evidence, arguments, the
merit of claims, competing interests or considerations, etc.
2. Scope of Application Outside of Charter Jurisprudence
Another question remaining to be resolved is, whether the Rigorous
Approach has a scope of application that reaches beyond Charter
analyses? Having recourse again, by analogy, to statutory interpretation,
a task much akin to and related to purpose construction, one observes that
similar approaches to statutory interpretation are used very broadly, without
the declaration of pre-determined restrictions in potential applicability.
As noted earlier, the Rigorous Approach to purpose construction has much
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in common, at the level of rationales for its use, governing principles, and
concrete sources of evidence, with the general accepted approaches to
statutory interpretation.109 Thus, it seems to me, there is no evident reason
why Markhali’s scope of application need be limited to Charter issues.
Elsewhere in constitutional law, the purpose of a law is an important
factor in determining its pith and substance within division of powers
cases. Arguably, a significantly more rigorous approach to consideration
of the legislative object has already long been used in these division of
powers cases than in Charter cases.110 Nevertheless, the systematic
aspect, analytical structure, and thoroughness of Markhali’s Rigorous
Approach to purpose construction seem capable of enhancing that part of
pith and substance analysis. Doctrines specific to certain powers also
sometimes mandate construal of the statutory purpose. For example,
valid criminal law is said to require a criminal purpose besides a
prohibition and a penalty.111 The latter two questions are of form, often
easily answered, leaving the purpose as the more difficult question.
Markhali’s Rigorous Approach would seem well matched with the needs
in that context.
Beyond constitutional law, a question often confronted in
administrative law is whether a state body or official has exceeded the
discretion conferred by law. An important factor in determining this is
the statutory purpose underlying the discretion. As Rand J. famously said
in Roncarelli v. Duplessis:
‘Good faith’ in this context … means carrying out the statute according
to its intent and for its purpose; it means good faith in acting with a
rational appreciation of that intent and purpose and not with an
improper intent and for an alien purpose....112

Subtler cases would particularly benefit from the kind of accurate and
reliable construal of the purpose that Markhali’s Rigorous Approach
offers.
109
Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at para. 33. On statutory interpretation, see more generally
Sullivan, supra, note 32.
110
See, e.g., Hodge v. The Queen (Canada), [1883] UKPC 59, [1883] 9 A.C. 117 (J.C.P.C.);
CIGOL v. Saskatchewan, [1977] S.C.J. No. 124, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 545 (S.C.C.), revg [1975] S.J.
No. 445 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] S.C.J. No. 95, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463 (S.C.C.), affg
[1991] N.S.J. No. 312 (N.S.C.A.).
111
Reference re Validity of Section 5 (a) Dairy Industry Act, [1948] S.C.J. No. 42, [1949]
S.C.R. 1 (S.C.C.), affd [1951] A.C. 179 (U.K.P.C.).
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Many other possibilities throughout the law could be mentioned. It will
be for future jurisprudence to determine whether Markhali’s Rigorous
Approach is — like similar approaches to the related legal task of statutory
interpretation — of potentially broad application across diverse areas of
law wherever a spotlight is placed on the statutory objective, or whether it
is to be restrictively applied only to Charter claims.

V. CONCLUSION
The Rigorous Approach to purpose construction introduced in
Markhali heralds an important advance in Charter jurisprudence, with
potentially far-reaching future implications across Canadian law. Long
the “soft underbelly”113 of the Charter, questions of legislative objective
are now, post-Markhali, slated to be put to the rigours of a comprehensive,
systematic, in-depth analysis before they are permitted to decide, through
their key role in doctrines like overbreadth, discrimination, and
proportionality, whether laws are to be upheld or struck down. Beyond the
gains in accuracy, reliability, clarity, and consistency entailed by the
Rigorous Approach, the advance may yield benefits for all legal actors in
the adjudicative process: parties may rely on greater predictability to
plan; courts might see more complete and robust adversarial debate;
legislatures may gain clarity allowing them to correct constitutional
defects at the point of origin; the justice system may enjoy enhanced
public confidence in the very contexts where it has sometimes been most
questioned. While the applicability outside the Charter of Markhali’s
Rigorous Approach to statutory purpose construction is not yet known,
conceptually it would seem capable — analogously to similar approaches
to statutory interpretation — of broad application across Canadian law,
with similar salutary effects.

113

Attributed to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
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